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REDUCING UNIONS' MONOPOLY POWER:
COSTS AND BENEFITS*
ROBERT H. LANDE
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
Washington, D.C.

I.

and

RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR.
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

INTRODUCTION

No one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the labor market per se. [ARCHIBALD COX]I

T

HERE is a fundamental conflict between labor law and antitrust law.
The antitrust laws reflect the powerful idea that competition should usually dictate the way our economy is organized, to the benefit of the economy as a whole, including workers. But the labor exemption to the antitrust laws suggests a different policy: workers should have the right to
eliminate competition for wages, hours, and working conditions.
We plan to examine a key feature of the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws: the longstanding policy of allowing the workers of several firms, and
even of an entire industry, to bargain as a unit and the corresponding policy of allowing all affected employers to bargain together in opposition.
We compare this system to an alternative proposal-allowing the workers of each company to form a union but examining the mergers of those
unions by the standards of merger guidelines. Throughout this paper we assume that if two unions cannot merge they also cannot conspire to fix wages,
strike, and so forth, in accordance with "normal" antitrust principles.
We begin by attempting to determine the primary goals of the industrywide features of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Using Con-

* This is an abridged version of a draft presented at the Hoover Institution Conference on
Law and Economic Efficiency. Our larger piece is still in progress. We are grateful to
Mosche Adler, Nolan Clark, Deborah Crandall, Alan Fisher, Willis Goldsmith, James Hurwitz, Andrew Kramer, Howard Marvel, Patrick O'Brien, Cornelius Peck, Ross Petty, Robert Plotnick, Kim T. K. Seah, Joe Sims, and Tom Walton for providing us with extremely
helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All remaining mistakes are
our own.
I Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 252, 254 (1955).
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXVIII (May 1985)]
© 1985 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/85/2802-0009$01.50
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gress's goals in this area, we compare qualitatively the costs and benefits
of these alternatives. We ask whether preventing collective bargaining
units from possessing large market shares might reduce the monopoly
aspects and rent-seeking behavior of unions and employers, without
significantly sacrificing unions' abilities to protect workers' rents and enhance efficiency.2 Our goal is to frame the analysis in terms of a costbenefit trade-off. We provide a framework for debating whether this proposal might be in the best interest of both workers and society as a whole.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

Although hundreds of pages of labor statutes bear on the labor exemption to the antitrust laws,3 the core of this exemption arises from three
statutes: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 4 Congress's primary reason for passing the labor exemption seems to
have been to allow workers to form effective unions that could protect
them from the results of their inability to negotiate as equals with corporations. s This statutory relief sought primarily to protect workers from hav2 There have been other proposals for limiting unions in various ways. See, for example,
Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 659, 709-14 (1965) (reprinted from 6 J. Law & Econ. 152 (1963»; Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards
to Union Activities, 73 Yale L. J. 14 (1963); H. Gregg Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Problems: A Positive Program, 59 J. Pol. Econ. 277 (1951). However, many recent examinations
of the area conclude that the labor exemption is generally justified. See, for example,
Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (1984).
3 Numerous articles and decisions have analyzed the history of the conflict between labor
and antitrust. We need not repeat it here. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, lBEW, 325 U.S.
797 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1944); United States v. Hutchenson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941). These cases firmly established that collective bargaining enjoys a
general exemption from the antitrust laws. See also Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters, Local 100,421 U.S. 616 (1975). Some of the best articles in this area include
Symposium: The Application of Antitrust Laws to Labor-related Activities, 21 Duq. L. Rev.
331-448 (1983); Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1183
(1980); Meltzer, supra note 2.
4 Current version ofthe Sherman Act codified at 15 U .S.C. § I (1976). For the legislative
history of the Sherman Act's concern with labor, see Allen G. Siegel, Walter B. Connolly,
Jr., & Richard K. Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor-Magna Carta or Carte
Blanche? 13 Duq. L. Rev. 411, 415-20 (1975) and the sources cited therein. Current version
of the Clayton Act codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 17,52 (1976). Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-15 (1976). As the Supreme Court has observed, these laws are "interlacing statutes"
that must be read together to understand the labor exemption properly. See Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local 3, lBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945).
5 This short analysis of the legislative history of the exemption is based on a reading of
relevant Committee Reports, the material that the Supreme Court cited in important labor
exemption cases, and selected portions of the congressional debates. It is not meant to be a
complete examination of the topic. Only illustrative citations are provided. For examples of
Congress's quest for equality, in the Sherman Act debates Senator Stewart advocated
"combination among the laborers to protect themselves from grasping monopolies .... " 21
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ing to accept less than they were "entitled" to receive as a "fair" return
for their labor-in other words, Congress implicitly assigned property
rights to certain rents to workers. Efficiency also appears to have been a
concern. Congress wanted to prevent labor-management violence and
thereby to ensure the peaceful resolution of labor disputes through collective bargaining; this has clear efficiency implications. Members of Congress gave other reasons as well, but Congress's central concern was to
equalize workers' bargaining position so that they could earn a "fair"
wage, as many leading Supreme Court labor exemption opinions have
recognized. 6
This countervailing power notion also seems to have been the rationale
behind permitting multiemployer and industry-wide bargaining. 7 Formal
collective bargaining involving more than one employer and more than
one local union must be agreed to by every participating union and employer before it will be certified by the NLRB. Unions often coordinate
their behavior informally, however.
Congo Rec. 2606 (1890). The Clayton Act debates quote an article from Organized Labor,
May 23, 1914, entitled "Labor's Position on the Antitrust Law": "[Labor Unions] are
formed to prevent the lowering of wages even more than to further the raising of wages ... .
Their end is not a monopoly of work, but proper pay for the work the workers perform ... .
[Unions desire] only to see that the laborer gets his proper hire .... [Employers seek] to
gouge labor of its share of what it produces." 51 Congo Rec. 9551-52 (1914). Senator
Ashurst noted: "The individual employee is frequently unable to insist upon the 'square
deal'; ... unless he acts in concert with his brother employees." Jd. at 13,667. See also 51
Congo Rec. 9086 (workers should be able to "band together for the protection of their rights
and interests") (remarks of Rep. Kelly). See also 51 Congo Rec. 13,662 (remarks of Senator
Ashurst). The Senate Report on what later became the Norris-LaGuardia Act stated: "A
single laborer, standing alone, confronted with such far-reaching, overwhelming concentration of employer power, and compelled to labor for the support of himself and family, is
absolutely helpless to negotiate or to exert any influence over the fixing of his wages or the
hours and conditions of his labor." S. Rep. 163. 72d Cong .• 1st Sess, to accompany S.935 at
9. There was also a realization that strikes were harmful to the economy as a whole. See 51
Congo Rec. 9658 (remarks of Rep. Volstead). We nevertheless found only scattered direct
references to the efficiency concept. See, for example. 51 Congo Rec. 13.668. Other congressional goals included protecting workers' freedom of contract, protecting workers from
arbitrary employer activity. and preserving social stability. See 51 Congo Rec. 13.662 (remarks of Senator Ashurst). S. Rep. 163. 72d Cong .• 1st Sess .• to accompany S. 935. mentioned as goals securing "that freedom of association. self-organization. and mutual help and
protection which all of us want to make secure" (page 8) and "the redress of grievances
[and] peace rather than strife" (page 10).
6 For example. the Court noted in United States v. Hutchenson, 312 U.S. at 229. quoting
with approval Duplex Co. v. Deering. 254 U.S. 443, 484 (1921), that the exemption "was
designed to equalize before the law the position of working men and employer as industrial
combatants. "
7 No law directly permits multiemployer bargaining. Its origins are obscure, and it appears to be judicially created. See The Developing Labor Law (Charles J. Morris ed .• 2d ed.
1983); Leonard L. Scheinholtz & Kenneth Kettering, Exemption under the Antitrust Laws
for Joint Employer Activity, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 346. 355-57 (1983). As those sources note, the
Supreme Court has approved the existence of multiemployer bargaining units on several
occasions.
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Given the background, it is not surprising that Congress and the Supreme Court did not consider the possibility that there might be ways to
secure equality for workers with fewer inefficient side effects. s One
comes away with the impression that Congress saw the choice as either
offering unions virtually complete exemption from the antitrust laws or
not achieving anything close to equality of bargaining power. 9 The elimination or reduction of union monopoly power is not, however, inconsistent with the legislative language or with the congressional record. Existing law arose from the courts' inability to achieve the congressional goal
of equality while limiting union monopoly power. The notion of preserving equality of bargaining through imposing market share restraints on
unions and multiemployer bargaining units is perhaps a more finely tuned
approach than could have been expected at the time.

III.
A.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE INDUSTRY-WIDE EXEMPTION

Protection of Workers' Rents and Enhancement of
Economic Efficiency

A policy consistent with the maximization of social welfare would possibly encourage, and at least not be inimical to, the formation of unions in
some form. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian cogently suggest how the existence of unions may promote efficiency. \0 Unions may be a mechanism to
reduce contract costs where the firm or employees invest in specific human capital. In the absence of unions, both employer and employee have
an incentive to extract rents opportunistically. The union may be able to
enhance the credibility of workers and ensure the performance of longterm contracts by preventing individual workers from acting opportunistically. At the same time, the union provides a credible threat (strike)
against companies that attempt opportunistic behavior. Thus, the existence of unions can ensure that workers obtain a larger portion of these
rents and also encourag~ efficiency. Some of these efficiencies might
depend on the size of the bargaining unit. We have, however, discovered

8 Complex NLRB procedures govern the formation and dissolution of multiemployer
bargaining units. See Morris, supra note 7, at 476-80. A crucial question posed by this paper
is whether the NLRB could refuse to certify multiemployer bargaining units with larger than
specified market shares.
9 The labor exemption was much more limited until the depression. Even if, as an anti depression measure, Congress wished through the Wagner Act to give monopoly power to
unions, we question whether this is an appealing rationale for allowing union monopoly
power today.
10 Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, & Armen AIchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978).
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no important examples of efficiencies that require unions larger than the
plant or firm, other than economies of organization and bargaining.
There is also a public goods argument for the existence of unions. Many
features of the workplace, such as safety conditions, pollution levels,
comfort, the speed of the production line, and the grievance procedure,
have a public goods quality. Many people get the gains, or no one does.
Any individual worker has an insufficient incentive to provide information
on these matters to management, because benefits accrue to workers
collectively. Unions can provide a "voice" and be efficient suppliers of
information to management. II Finally, unions may arise and persist as a
means of monitoring the effectiveness of management. 12 That is, badly
managed firms attract unions and realize gains from implementing more
effective use of the labor force. Workers may be better able than stockholders to monitor certain management inefficiencies. I3
The view of unions as efficient providers of services has support in the
empirical literature. In manufacturing and construction (and, at one time,
underground bituminous coal mining), unionized firms appear to have
greater productivity than nonunion firms, other things being equal. 14 Part
of the union/nonunion differential in productivity can be explained because the quit rate is much lower for unionized companies, 15 a fact consisSee Freeman & Medoff, supra note 2, at 8-10.
Clark, in his study of the cement industry, found that entrance of unions was typically
followed by a change in lower or middle management. Clark also found the quality of
management to be higher in unionized firms. Kim B. Clark, The Impact of Unionization on
Productivity: A Case Study, 33 Indus. Lab. Relations Rev. 451 (1980); Kim Clark, Unionization and Productivity: Micro Econometric Evidence, 95 Q. J. Econ. 613 (1980). An alternative hypothesis would be that firms with better management tend to become unionized. If
management is collecting short-term rents, the formation of a union may preserve these
rents for workers. This would not, however, explain a persistent association of unions with
better management. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism,
57 Pub. Interest 69 (1979).
13 Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Collective Bargaining; Can the
New Facts Be Explained by Monopoly Unionism, in New Approaches to Labor Unions
(Special Volume, Res. Labor Econ.) (Suppl. 2, Joseph Reid ed. 1983) at 293, conclude that
unions increase inequality among blue-collar workers due to the higher wages of blue-collar
union workers but reduce inequality among union workers and reduce the blue-collar/whitecollar differential. They argue that these latter equality effects are greater than the inequality
effect. However, one reason we do not find this argument convincing is that, in spite of their
claims, Freeman and Medoff are unable to compare the difference in inequality between the
situation in which unions exist and one in which unions do not exist. [d. at 304. In a careful
analysis of existing studies Lewis finds that unions are probably neutral with respect to
income inequality. See H. Gregg Lewis, Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey (forthcoming).
14 See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 13, and references cited therein. The higher productivity remains after the effect of capital-labor ratios and higher-quality labor for
unionized firms are taken into account.
15 [d. at 302.
11

12
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tent with the notion that unions may supply credibility to ensure longterm contract fulfillment. 16 The reduction in quit rates associated with
unionization cannot be attributed to monopoly wages, to reduction in
employer-initiated separations, or to unionization of more stable workers.
Rather, the critical factor seems to be changes in worker attitudes and
behavior that arise from the union setting. 17
Much of the theory and evidence demonstrating the efficiencies that
can arise from unions is new and controversial. Doubtless it wiII be
criticized. Even assuming that all of these efficiencies from unionization
do commonly arise and that unionization also serves to protect workers'
rents, however, the critical question for this paper is whether industrywide collective bargaining is required to produce these benefits. We have
found no evidence that the existence of monopoly power by unions vis-avis employers is necessary for, or even related to, those aspects of unions
that promote efficiency or protect workers' rents.
B.

Rent-seeking Behavior and Economic Inefficiency

1. Monopoly Aspects of the Exemption. There is surprisingly little
reliable information on the type, extent, or magnitude of those effects of
unions associated solely with their monopoly power. Reasonable data on
the market share of unions do not exist. On the order of 200 studies of the
relative effects of unions have appeared since Lewis's classic 1963
study. 18 Current work by Lewis finds that these studies show an average
union/nonunion wage differential of about 15 percent. 19 In addition, there
are almost no data that might be used to measure the monopoly power of
unions, or even concentration ratios, and no estimates of that part of the
wage gap or gain due to monopoly power. 20 Thus we know neither the

16 Freeman and Medoff point out that the firm responds primarily to the needs of the
marginal worker, who is young and marketable. In a unionized setting, by contrast, the
union takes account of all workers, and senior workers may be more powerful within
the union in determining its demands at the bargaining table, so that the desires of workers
who are less able to leave the enterprise are also represented. Freeman & Medoff, supra
note 2, at 9-10. Since unions ensure greater weight for the preferences of senior workers
they might encourage younger workers to invest in job-specific training and to stay.
17 [d.
18 H. Gregg Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the U.S. (1963).
19 See Lewis, supra note 13, at ch. 9. This work is unpublished, and his estimates must be
regarded as preliminary. Lewis believes this estimate has an upward bias. These studies
provide an estimate of the wage gain from unionization relative to nonunionization only if
the supply curve of nonunion labor is completely elastic and is unaffected by unionization.
20 As far as we can determine no concentration ratios or Herfindahl index have been
calculated for unions. We have calculated a Herfindahl index for unions at the industry two-
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wage effects of unions compared to not having a union nor the wage
effects of union monopoly power.
Consequently, there is considerable controversy about how much of
the union/nonunion wage differential is attributable to the efficiency effects of unions and how much to the monopoly effects. Some argue that
the efficiency effects completely offset or even override the effect of
monopoly.
The best evidence is that they do not. 21 A study of253 NLRB representation elections from 1962 to 1980 found that stock prices fell both when a
petition for a union election was filed with the NLRB and when a union
was certified as bargaining agent. Moreover, the fall in stock prices was
larger in response to a petition before the election in cases in which the
union ultimately won the e1ection. 22 Second; and consistent with the previous point, management usually resists the formation of a union. Third,
the rate of profit per unit of capital appears to be lower under unionism. 23
Finally, evidence of the influence of monopoly power on union wages is
found in the pattern of the union/nonunion wage differential as it varies
with the unions' jurisdiction. The wage gap depends crucially on the
ability of a union to extend its coverage to all firms in a particular market. 24 A characteristic of some unions that are relatively successful, such
as miners, longshoremen, and construction workers, is that there are
distinct geographic limits to the relevant product markets.
Because the estimates of the monopoly effect of unions are crude, there
digit level. The index was constructed using union data from the u.s. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, Bulletin 2079 (1980)
and employment data from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1980). The Directory of
National Unions, Appendix I, 105-07, gives the percentage of membership employed in
each industry group for the major unions in each group. From these figures the number of
employees represented by each union in each industry was calculated by taking the appropriate percentage of the membership figures given in the directory. The figure for the market
share of each union was then calculated as the ratio of number of union employees in the
industry to total number of employees in the industry. All data are for 1978. Even for such
gross market definitions the index is above the 1800 level and is often higher than corporate
four-digit industry concentration levels within the same two-digit classification.
21 See Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits,
Growth, and Productivity, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 893 (1984).
22 Richard S. Ruboch & Martin B. Zimmerman, Unionization and Profitability: Evidence
from the Capital Market (unpublished manuscript) (Sloan School Mgmt., MIT, October
1982).
23 Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, Trade Unionism in the Production Process, 86 J.
Pol. Econ. 355 (1978); Kim Clark, The Impact of Unionization on Firm Performance:
Profits, Growth and Productivity (working paper, Harv. Bus. Sch. HBS 83-9900 1983); John
Frantz, The Impact of Trade Unions on Productivity in the Wood Household Furniture
Industry (1970) (unpublished senior honors thesis. Harv. Univ.).
24 See Harold M. Levinson. Determining Forces in Collective Bargaining (1966).
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are no good estimates of the deadweight loss. A recent estimate puts the
loss at approximately $5-$10 billion per year. 25 These calculations also
imply a transfer of wealth from shareholders and consumers to union
members of about ten times this amount. 26
In addition, unions can be expected to take part oftheir rent in working
conditions or featherbedding instead of wages. 27 For both these reasons,
the choice of inputs and working conditions will be affected by the existence of unions with monopoly power, and restrictive work practices and
featherbedding are associated with unions. 28 And, although there are no
reliable recent estimates, such restrictive practices impose a social cost.
Albert Rees some twenty years ago concluded that this cost is probably
larger than the welfare losses associated with the relative wage effect. 29
Multiemployer bargaining is consistent with the desire to equalize bargaining power, and it can offset union power. Multiemployer bargaining
may not involve monopoly power and may materially reduce negotiating
costs. To this extent such bargaining units are desirable. To the extent
multiemployer bargaining involves monopoly power on either side, however, it is not in the interests of consumers. Further, employers often are
much less concerned with their absolute costs than with their costs relative to their competitors, and since multiemployer bargaining reduces the
elasticity of labor demand as compared with single-firm bargaining, it is
possible that multiemployer bargaining could lead to increased wages. 30
25 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 2, at 57. This estimate of the deadweight loss from the
union wage effect by Freeman and Medoff might be too high, perhaps by two-thirds. Their
estimate is based on partial equilibrium assumptions that are clearly inappropriate. Neither
income nor cross effects are taken into account. Lee Edelfson, The Deadweight Loss
Triangle as a Measure of General Equilibrium Welfare Loss: Harberger Reconsidered
(working paper, Univ. Washington, Dep't Econ. 1984) provides a method of doing this and
finds general equilibrium calculations of the deadweight loss triangle for typical simulation of
parameters usually to be a fraction of the loss calculated by partial equilibrium analysis. The
threat of unionization, however, leads to higher wages for nonunionized workers, tending to
make this estimate too low.
26 Calculated from Freeman & Medoff, supra note 2, at 267.
27 Existing labor law does not enable unions to maximize rents. To maximize its total
rents or its wage rate, ignoring costs of extraction (transaction costs), a union would need to
control the price and quantities of other inputs and the price, quantities, qualities, and
characteristics of output. However, such control is often illegal. Without it, as unions raise
their wages, employers adjust their employment of all inputs and output margins, thereby in
part frustrating union attempts to maximize the benefits that they achieve for their members.
This result can be inferred from Yoram BarzeI & Keith Leffler, Tie-in Sales and Multi-Good
Pricing (working paper, Univ. Wash., Dep't. Econ. 1980); Frederick Warren Boulton, Vertical Control and Markets (1978).
28 For an economic analysis see Paul Weinstein, The Featherbedding Problem, 54 Am.
Econ. Rev. 145 (1964).
29 Albert Rees, The Effect of Union on Resource Allocations, 6 J. Law & Econ. 69 (1963).
30 Thus, mUltiemployer bargaining is more likely where labor constitutes a relatively large
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As the next section illustrates, multiemployer bargaining units also increase the potential for rent seeking by unions and employers.
2. Rent Seeking by Unions and Employers. An emerging literature
forcefully argues that the problem of rent seeking by raising competitors'
costs is an important, widespread, and costly phenomenon. 31 One example of this behavior comes from unions' and/or employers' using the
unions' monopoly power to raise the costs of rival employers. Differences
in capitallIabor ratios, safety conditions, environmental conditions,
methods of doing business, costs to enter a market or to introduce innovative business techniques all present potential opportunities for union contracts that affect firms in different ways. Cases of probable rent seeking
by employers attempting to use unions' power form much of the backbone of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. 32
In the past decade dozens of cases have been decided in which rent
seeking to raise costs to competitors using union monopoly power probably was involved. These and earlier cases involve possible attempts by a
union to raise costs to nonunion firms and attempts by employers to raise
costs to innovative rivals and to new entrants. This rent seeking is costly
proportion of total costs, a fact consistent with the use of multiemployer bargaining to
escape a competitive disadvantage. D. R. Deaton & P. B. Beaumont, The Determinates of
Bargaining Structure: Some Large Scale Evidence for Britain, 18 Brit. J. Ind. Relations 101
(1980); Wallace E. Hendricks & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Determinates of Bargaining Structure in U.S. Manufacturers Industries, 35 Ind. & Lab. Relations Rev. 181-95 (1982). Empirical evidence indicates multiemployer bargaining units raise wages for units operating in the
local, as opposed to the national, labor markets. See Wallace E. Hendricks & Lawrence M.
Kahn, The Demand for Labor Market Structure: An Economic Approach, 2 J. Lab. Econ.
412 (1984); Peter Feulle, Wallace E. Hendricks, & Lawrence M. Kahn, Wage and NonWage Outcomes in Collective Bargaining: Determinates and Tradeoffs, 2 Lab. Research 39
1981); Wallace E. Hendricks, Labor Market Structure and Union Wage Levels, 13 Econ.
Inquiry 401 (1975).
31 That cost-increasing rent seeking may be common should come as no surprise. The
gains from raising a rival's costs are immediate; there is no sacrifice of short-run profits for
longer-term gains. The rival's response to increased costs is to decrease output, allowing
some combination of a higher price and an increased market share for the firm initiating the
cost increase. Finally, cost-increasing strategies do not require a deep pocket or superior
access to financial resources. Salop and Scheffman show that a sufficient condition for a
cost-increasing strategy to be profitable is that the market price must increase by more than
the increase in the average costs of the dominant firm. This increases the dominant firm's
profits even if the firm does not adjust outputs in response to the increased costs. Steven
Salop & David Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267 (1983). For early
examples of rent seeking in this context, see Howard Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reexamination of Early English Experience, 20 J. Law & Econ. 379 (1977); Oliver Williamson,
Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 84 Q. J. Econ.
(1968). The classic article on rent seeking is by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
32 For representative cases, see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis
Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.) (1958).
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both in terms of outcome and in terms of resources consumed in its
pursuit, although no estimates of these costs can be easily made.
Collective bargaining inevitably affects employers in different ways.
One cannot easily determine if these differential effects result from a
union's seeking its own ends or from the attempts of one set of employers
to raise the costs of others. In fact, these results in many instances may be
compatible. Economic analysis therefore cannot cure the ambiguities
flowing from the legal principles that currently define the boundaries of
the labor exemption to the antitrust statutes. 33
Under existing law it is all but impossible to prevent such rent-seeking
behavior by unions or employers. The courts seem to be unwilling to find
unlawful conduct unless the unions "conspire" with some nonexempt
group (such as employers) to restrain competition on subjects outside the
ordinary purview of bargaining (that is, different from wages, hours, or
working conditions).34 Courts also place varying reliance on whether the
restraint is a labor market or product market restraint and whether the
nonexempt group had the agreement thrust upon it or actively sought it.
These distinctions are without substantial economic foundation. A successful economic conspiracy requires an agreement and the ability to
police it. The collective bargaining process and the collective bargaining
agreement can provide both of these. The current legal doctrines catch
only the unwise and unwary.
Economic theory provides no justification for the Byzantine distinctions that arise naturally from the existing system of applying the antitrust
law to multiemployer bargaining. In the next section we propose one way
out: change the overall framework of the labor exemption.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF SUBJECTING UNIONS TO THE ANTIMERGER LAWS:
GUIDELINES FOR UNION MERGERS

We propose that the law treat unions and corporations equally: mergers
and joint operations are permissible, except those for which the anticompetitive potential is likely to outweigh the procompetitive benefits. 35 One
33 The current law focuses on the wrong issue-"agreement"-when it should be concerned with competitive effect. If unions have no monopoly power, the presumption should
be that their success in setting wages reflects efficiency considerations. An extension of the
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian argument spells out the efficient possibility. For example, a
firm with wage flexibility may unilaterally lower wages for workers who have made firmspecific capital investments. See Benjamin Klein, Contract Costs and Administered Prices:
An Economic Theory of Rigid Wages, 74 Am. Econ. Rev., Papers & Proc. 332 (1984).
34 Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) muddied an
already confusing area of the law. For a discussion of this case and the legal standards in this
area see the articles cited in note 3 supra.
3S The normal antitrust rules against conspiracies in restraint of trade between corpora-
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should analyze contemplated union mergers and joint bargaining, like
similar corporate activities, by balancing the inefficiencies likely to arise
against any efficiencies and other congressionally sought benefits so arising. 36 And, just as antitrust law makes the presumption that implicit or
explicit coordination between firms is more likely as industry concentration rises, a more concentrated labor market (that is, a market consisting
of unions within the same industry) would be assumed more easily able to
coordinate its actions. 37
Assuming that unions provide both efficiencies and market power effects, the law should develop a set of merger guidelines for unions. 38
Under the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, most horizontal corporate mergers are allowed unless they increase concentration significantly-the Guidelines suggest an increase of 50-100 points in the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a benchmark. Because Congress's prime
objective in this area is achieving bargaining equality between labor and
capital, the most appropriate way to resolve the trade-off is to use the
corporate standards for union mergers as well. 39
We have thus far uncovered no significant appropriable worker rents
that could not be protected, or union efficiencies that could not be
tions would also apply to conspiracies between unions. Similarly, just as two or more
corporations often can undertake joint ventures without violating the antitrust laws, we
would often permit unions to form joint ventures, particularly those directed toward research. For example, we would generally permit some or all of the unions in an industry to
form a joint venture to research ways to improve worker safety. We would not, of course,
permit unions to enter a "joint venture" to achieve identical wages.
36 For a corporate merger trade-off analysis see Oliver Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968). For a recent
discussion of the topic see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in
Merger Enforcement, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1580 (1983).
37 We do not explore here the practical task of defining markets for the purpose of
establishing union merger and bargaining guidelines. We note that in the case of craft unions
the relevant market may be geographic and cut across several industries. In the case of
industrial unions the relevant market may be coincidental with the industry.
38 The raison d'etre of guidelines is to give businessmen predictability and certainty, and
to protect them from arbitrary or politically motivated governmental action. See Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal
Stud. 399, 423-26 (1973). It might, of course, be difficult to keep political considerations
from entering the type of analysis discussed in this paper.
39 Such guidelines should probably make a de minimus exception for industries with
fewer than a specified number of workers. For such industries, we might presume (without
evidence) that inefficiencies caused by industry-wide unions were unlikely to be substantial,
while industry-wide economies of scale might be significant and suggest that the entire
industry's workers be allowed to unionize. Further, the union merger guidelines would have
to define its terms very carefully. When calculating union market shares, for example, it
would have to decide whether to count all of the workers at an open shop operation receiving benefits from the existence of the union, or only the union's members. Finally, there may
be labor markets, such as certain building trade markets, for which special solutions might
have to be devised.

308

THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

achieved, despite some limitations on the market shares of unions. Any
absolute size thresholds for effective union management, general experience and n~gotiating expertise, organization, and financial strength are
presumably obtainable through vertical or conglomerate union mergers or
through small horizontal union mergers,40 which generally would be legal
under our proposal.
The costs of our proposal are several. First, there is trade-off between
union size and multi employer bargaining on the one hand and negotiating
costs on the other. Since our proposal would reduce the size of some
bargaining units, it may well cause small increases in negotiating costs in
these cases. Among the costs of our proposal we consider that during a
transition period we might expect collusive activity, given unions' established patterns of behavior. Broken up by a law unions would undeniably
consider unfair, conspiracy among unions might be a natural tendency, at
least initially. Our proposal could also have a negative effect on worker
morale and productivity and could lead to violence by disgruntled union
members, at least in the short term.
Moreover, unions could still observe each others' behavior and act
interdependently. So would employers. One employer would be reluctant
to give in to wage demands unless it knew that its rivals would also.
Employers and unions would both have an incentive to behave like
oligopolists.
The benefits of our proposal include the reduction of deadweight loss
and rent-seeking costs. Our proposal would generate other benefits by
stimulating competition among unions. Competition within an industry
among unions and among union leaders is desirable, just as is competition
among corporations and among corporate executives within an industry.
Unions (and union leaders) would compete for members. Competition
among unions would also determine which union could convince workers
that it could secure the best benefits and working conditions for its members, perhaps weeding out inefficient unions or union leaders. This competition could also weed out corrupt union leaders who pay themselves
too much, take bribes, or sell out to management.
An additional benefit would be the growth and formation of unions.
Employers often resist the unionization of their employees. If the
efficiency effects of unions are significant, both employers and employees

40 For example, unions in different industries would usually be permitted to pool their
financial resources to enable individual unions to sustain and publicize strikes. Vertical and
conglomerate mergers are virtually certain to arise and help unions achieve scale economies.
Such mergers are a large part of our answer to those who believe that our proposal might
destroy unions' strength.
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should desire them, even in the absence of their monopoly power. If the
efficiency effects of unions are as common as some claim, our proposal
might lead to the growth of unions in those areas in which the efficiencies
could be realized.
One practical problem could arise from this paper's approach: it would
require evaluating mergers between corporations in terms of both corporate and union market shares (and other factors). Suppose, for example,
that two firms wanted to merge, and that each had 5 percent of an unconcentrated market. Courts and economists alike would normally allow
such a merger. But suppose that their employees belonged to different
industrial unions, that the relevant labor market is coextensive with the
relevant product and geographic market, and that each of the unions had
20 percent of the workers in that market. We could avoid letting the
unions merge to control 40 percent of the industry by several different
methods.
First, we could require the workers of the combined company to join
whichever of the two unions had the smaller market share. 41 Although this
solution could still cause the union merger guidelines to be violated somewhat, such violations might not be too substantial, and this solution might
be optimal. 42 Second, we could require the unions to split or reform on
their own in any way that ensured that the unions did not exceed the
Union Merger Guidelines. This could be disruptive, requiring many workers to change unions. But it would have the advantages of flexibility and
maximum control for workers over the format of their unions. A third
possibility would be to allow only those corporate mergers that would not
result in violations of the union merger guidelines. This solution could,
however, have the unfortunate effect of depriving society of the benefits
of many efficiency-enhancing corporate mergers.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper was to raise for discussion the desirability of
changing the existing labor exemption and subjecting unions and multiemployer bargaining units to the antimerger and other antitrust laws. This
proposal might substantially fulfill the primary goals of society underlying
the labor exemption but in a more efficient way than the prevailing system. It would treat worker and business combinations equally, in a way
that might make society, including workers, better off. It also might pre41 Of course, these workers should also have the option of forming their own separate
union.
42 However, the smaller union may be smaller because it is less efficient.
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serve the rent-protection and efficiency-enhancing aspects of unions
while diminishing their monopoly and rent-seeking aspects. 43 It should
also continue to prevent employers from opportunistically acquiring
workers' rents and from combining with unions to engage in rent-seeking
behavior. Had our proposal for limiting union market shares been on the
agenda when the basic features of the labor exemptions were being formulated and interpreted, it might have been chosen instead, either by
Congress or the Supreme Court, as also consistent with Congress's goals.
More~ver, the fact that our proposal would give a stimulus to the growth
of unions may, even now, in this period of declining union membership,
go a long way toward reducing otherwise powerful opposition. 44
Whether such a solution actually would be superior to the present
system depends on several unanswered, mostly empirical, questions,
which have been discussed throughout this paper. Our purpose was not to
answer these questions but to raise them and to suggest that carefully
specified limitations on union monopoly power might be in the public
interest.
43 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 711, warns that a total ban on union mergers could produce
unduly weak, atomistic unions. Our proposal, by contrast, which would allow many hori·
zontal, and virtually all vertical and conglomerate union mergers, should not suffer from this
defect. Given the current wave of union mergers, consideration of our proposal may be
timely.
44 In Japan multiemployer bargaining is relatively rare. Our proposal would move the
U.S. system closer to the Japanese model. See William B. Gould, Labor Law in Japan and
the United States: A Comparative Perspective, 6 Indus. Relations L. J. I (1984).

